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1 Introduction
We revisit the classical problem of internalizing a negative externality through
Coasian contracting. Consider a principal who can implement a veriable produc-
tion level and an agent who is negatively a¤ected by the principals production.
In the prominent example discussed by Coase (1960), the principal is a cattle
raiser and the agent is a farmer whose crops may be destroyed by straying cat-
tle. Analogously, the principal may be a pollution-generating rm and the agent
may be a nearby community. We suppose that the agent has the right to be
free of pollution, so in the absence of an agreement between the two parties the
production level has to be zero.
Following Robs (1989) pioneering work on pollution claim settlements, we
assume that the parties are risk-neutral and that the principal can make a take-it-
or-leave-it o¤er to the agent. Suppose rst that there are no relevant constraints
on the transfer payments. Clearly, if there is complete information, according
to the Coase Theorem the rst-best solution that maximizes the partiestotal
surplus will be attained. Moreover, the rst-best solution will also be attained
if the agent becomes privately informed about his disutility of pollution after
the contract is written (see Arrow, 1979, and dAspremont and Gérard-Varet,
1979). In both cases, the principal will extract the expected total surplus. Yet,
as has been shown by Rob (1989), if the agent has private information already at
the contracting stage, the principal faces a trade-o¤ between rent extraction and
achieving ex post e¢ ciency, so there will typically be too little production and
hence too little pollution compared to the rst-best solution.
In the present paper, we analyze the case in which the agent becomes privately
informed about his cost type only after the contract is written.1 For example,
in our framework the agent could be a municipality that contemplates granting
a fracking permit. Fracking is a relatively new technology, so it is not yet fully
known what the e¤ects on the environment and human population will be. Sim-
ilarly, carbon capture and storage is a promising new technology, which however
exposes the host community to poorly understood leakage risks. The siting of
such facilities may therefore require to negotiate a host community compensation
agreement (Ter Mors et al., 2012). However, we assume that payments from the
1According to the taxonomy proposed by Hart and Holmström (1987, p. 76), adverse
selectionmodels are characterized by pre-contractual private information, while hidden in-
formationmodels are characterized by post-contractual private information. In their wording,
we thus study a hidden information variant of Robs (1989) adverse selection problem.
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principal to the agent must be non-negative.2 Such a constraint may be relevant if
the agent has no resources or if it is politically infeasible to let a community that
is harmed by pollution make positive payments to the polluter. Non-negativity
constraints on payments are often imposed in hidden action models with limited
liability (see e.g. Innes, 1990), but to the best of our knowledge they have not yet
been studied in hidden information problems where the principal is in charge of
a contractible action and there are more than two types.3
We show that while adding the non-negativity constraint to our problem has
no e¤ect in the two-type case, a novel kind of distortion away from the rst-best
solution can arise if there are more than two types. In particular, if the agents
cost type is continuously distributed, we nd that for low levels of the agents costs
there is a downward distortion (except for the lowest cost type), while for high
levels of the agents costs there is an upward distortion. This nding contrasts
with standard adverse selection models, where the solution usually involves a
downward distortion only.
The intuition for the upward distortion in our hidden information setup is as
follows. The fact that payments have to be non-negative means that the principal
cannot extract the expected total surplus by letting the agent make a monetary
transfer payment to the principal. Therefore, utility will instead be transferred
from the agent to the principal through an ine¢ ciently high production level. As
a consequence, our model can provide a novel explanation for why in practice we
may observe too much production and hence too much pollution compared to the
rst-best solution.4
Our result has interesting implications with regard to how the expected total
surplus level depends on the sequence of events. Recall that in the absence of a
constraint on feasible payments, the expected total surplus in standard adverse
selection models with pre-contractual private information is smaller than the
2In the formal analysis, we will make the more general assumption that the agent cannot
pay more than t  0 to the principal. For simplicity, in the introduction we focus our discussion
on the case t = 0.
3The introduction of a non-negativity constraint on payments would have no e¤ect in stan-
dard adverse selection models with pre-contractual private information such as Rob (1989);
cf. Section 4.1 below. See La¤ont and Martimort (2002, section 3.5) for a discussion of two-
type hidden information models with limited liability constraints.
4While Robs (1989) classical model of pollution claim settlements can explain why pollution
may be at ine¢ ciently low levels from a social welfare perspective, many empirical studies nd
that in reality there may well be too much pollution, see e.g. OECD (2016).
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expected total surplus in corresponding hidden information models with post-
contractual private information (where the rst-best solution is achieved).5 Yet,
given that payments have to be non-negative, the expected total surplus can be
larger in situations where the agent has learned his private information already
at the contracting stage than in otherwise similar situations in which he will learn
his private information after the contract has been written. Intuitively, when the
agent learns his type after the contract has been signed, the principal will extract
the expected total surplus by introducing ex post ine¢ cient upward distortions,
which can reduce the expected total surplus compared to a situation in which the
principal must leave a rent to the agent since he has private information at the
contracting stage already.
Related literature. Starting with Innes (1990), imposing a non-negativity con-
straint on payments from the principal to the agent has become a standard as-
sumption in the moral hazard literature that studies optimal contracts when the
agent is in charge of a hidden action.6 In this literature, the principal must typ-
ically leave a limited liability rent to the agent in order to induce him to choose
high e¤ort. To reduce this rent, the principal may prefer to implement a smaller
e¤ort level than she would do in a rst-best world.7
Yet, in the literature on hidden information problems, the implications of
bounded transfer payments have received less attention. In particular, following
Sappington (1983), some authors have studied hidden information problems in
which the agent chooses a veriable action and is protected by limited liability
in the sense of a lower bound on the agents ex post utility.8 Such constraints
5For a textbook exposition, see e.g. La¤ont and Martimort (2002, sections 2.6 and 2.11).
6Some authors such as Tirole (1999, p. 745) and La¤ont and Martimort (2002, p. 174) use the
term e¢ ciency wagemodel as a label for hidden action problems with resource-constrained
agents. Note that limited liability also plays a central role in the sharecropping literature that
studies the agrarian sector of less developed countries (see e.g. Shetty, 1988). As has been
pointed out by La¤ont and Martimort (2002, section 4.8.2), this literature typically assumes
at the outset that sharing rules are linear, while the more recent contract-theoretic literature
studies optimal contracts without imposing ad hoc constraints on the class of feasible contracts.
7See La¤ont and Martimort (2002, section 4.3) for a textbook exposition. For recent appli-
cations of hidden action models with bounded payments where limited liability constraints lead
to deviations from rst-best outcomes, see e.g. Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012), Chen and Chiu
(2013), Imhof and Kräkel (2014), Tamada and Tsai (2014), or Kräkel and Schöttner (2016).
See also Lewis and Sappington (2000) for a model where a wealth-constrained agent exerts
unobservable e¤ort and is privately informed about his ability at the contracting stage.
8See e.g. Martimort (2006, p. 15) or the implementation stage in Khalil et al. (2006). Note
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have e¤ects similar to the individual rationality constraints in adverse selection
models, which under standard assumptions lead to downward (but not upward)
distortions.
Pesendorfer (1998) also imposes a non-negativity constraint on payments in a
variant of Robs (1989) model of pollution claim settlements. However, he studies
an adverse selection problem with multiple agents whose cost types (which are
privately known already at the contracting stage) are correlated across agents.
Klibano¤and Morduch (1995) consider an adverse selection problem which shares
with our model the feature that the production of one rm can have an external
e¤ect on another rm. In contrast to Rob (1989) and the present paper, they
assume that rm 1 has the right to cause externalities by its production and it
has private information about its protability, while the impact of the externality
on rm 2 is assumed to be public knowledge.
Alternative explanations of upward distortions of production levels can also
be given in models where the agent has pre-contractual private information that
di¤er from Robs (1989) standard adverse selection setup. For example, an incen-
tive to understate costs due to a reservation utility that is decreasing in marginal
costs can lead to higher production levels for larger cost types. In particular,
Lewis and Sappington (1989) study adverse selection with countervailing incen-
tives due to type-dependence of the agents reservation utility, Wirl and Huber
(2005) analyze countervailing incentives created by the threat of a pollution tax,
and Kessler et al. (2005) consider an adverse selection model where a signal that
is correlated with the type of a wealth-constrained agent can be veried ex post.
Of course, too much pollution can also be a consequence of insu¢ cient regula-
tion and impediments to Coasian bargaining like adverse selection on the rms
abatement costs or enforcement problems (see Baron, 1985, and Bontems and
Bourgeon, 2005). In our setting, the agent has the right to be free of pollution,
all pollution levels can be perfectly enforced, and ine¢ ciently high pollution can
arise because the principal has bargaining power but not enough instruments to
e¢ ciently extract rents.
that in standard hidden information problems without wealth constraints, it does not matter
whether the veriable action (say, the production level) is chosen by the agent or by the prin-
cipal. We study the case in which the principal is in charge of implementing the action (so the
contract can always be enforced, since the principal is solvent and thus not judgement-proof).
If instead a wealth-constrained agent is in charge of the action, it may be impossible to enforce
the contractually specied action. In this case, the wealth constraint may imply a lower bound
on the agents ex post utility.
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Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The basic model is presented in Section 2. We analyze the model in Section
3. In Section 4, we investigate implications of our results and we discuss some
extensions of the model. Concluding remarks follow in Section 5. Some proofs
have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
There are two risk-neutral parties, a principal (a pollution-generating rm) and
an agent (say, representing a nearby town), who enter a contractual relationship.
The principal has a technology to produce any output x 2 [0; xmax], yielding prot
V (x), for some di¤erentiable and concave function V with V (0) = 0: Production
has a negative externality on the agent. If the principal were not liable for
the damage that production may cause, she would choose the quantity xnl =
arg maxx2[0;xmax] V (x). We assume that xnl is well-dened and take xmax = xnl, so
that V is increasing on [0; xmax].
An output level x leads to a (non-monetary) cost cx for the agent, where
initially neither the principal nor the agent knows the realization of the cost
parameter c 2 C. Cost types are distributed according to a cumulative distri-
bution function F , which is concave.9 Unless stated otherwise, we assume that
the support of F is an interval, C = [cL; cH ] with cH > cL  0; and F is dif-
ferentiable with density f > 0. We also consider the case that the support is
nite, C = fc1; : : : ; cng with cL = c1 < : : : < cn = cH . We study a Bayesian
mechanism design problem; i.e., we impose no ad hoc restriction on the class of
feasible contracts, the principal has full commitment power, and except for the
realization of c all aspects of the model are common knowledge.10
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the principal proposes a contract,
which consists of a menu of production levels and associated transfer payments.
Then the agent accepts or rejects. We assume that when no agreement between
the parties is reached, the agent has the right to be free of pollution. The agents
9Concavity of F means that for all c; c0; c00 2 [cL; cH ] with c in the support of F and c =
c0 + (1   )c00 for some  2 [0; 1]; it holds that F (c)  F (c0) + (1   )F (c00). The support
of F is the support of the corresponding probability distribution, i.e., the smallest closed set
having probability 1.
10See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 7) for an excellent introduction into the theory of
Bayesian mechanism design.
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reservation utility is therefore either equal to zero or given by some alternative
land use, and is denoted by u  0. The principals reservation utility is normalized
to 0. After the agent has accepted the contract, he privately learns the realized
cost parameter c.11 Finally, the contract is executed: The agent chooses a pro-
duction level and associated payment from the contractually agreed-upon menu.
The principal then implements the production level x and makes a payment t,
leading to payo¤s t  cx for the agent and V (x)  t for the principal.
The maximum expected surplus (which would always be attained in a rst-
best world) is denoted by
SFB =
Z cH
cL
max
x2[0;xmax]
(V (x)  cx)dF (c),
where we assume that SFB  u:
It is well-known that the principals problem has a simple solution if there are
no constraints on what the agent can pay. The optimal contract makes the agent
residual claimant for the prot and lets the principal receive the entire expected
surplus.12
Remark 1 If transfer payments are unbounded, the rst-best solution can be at-
tained by a contract that lets the agent decide on x and that species the payment
t(x) = u+ V (x)  SFB from the principal to the agent.
Observe that t(x) may be negative; i.e., the optimal contract may require a
positive transfer payment from the agent to the principal. Limits on the agents
wealth or political constraints may render this contract infeasible.13 In what
follows, we thus assume that the agents ability to make transfer payments to
the principal is restricted. Specically, we impose (adopting the wording of Pe-
sendorfer, 1998) a limited liabilityconstraint t   t , where t  0 represents
the agents wealth or some other bound on transfers. Note that this constraint
would have no e¤ect if the principal and the agent both knew the agents cost
11Note that subsequent to signing the contract, the parties might have to make time-
consuming relationship-specic investments before production can actually take place. For
simplicity, in order to focus on ex post ine¢ ciencies we do not model such investments explic-
itly (see e.g. Hart and Moore, 2008, for a similar approach).
12See e.g. La¤ont and Martimort (2002, p. 57).
13The fact that local authorities su¤er from binding budget constraints has often been em-
phasized by practitioners (see e.g. Committee on Climate Change, 2012).
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type.14 Moreover, note that under our assumptions limited liability does not af-
fect the implementability of the rst-best output schedule. Yet, given that the
constraint t   t has to be satised, the presence of post-contractual private
information on the agents side may constitute a transaction cost, which may
hinder the principal from appropriating the maximum expected surplus despite
having all the bargaining power. As a consequence, an ex post ine¢ cient outcome
may result.
3 Analysis
According to the revelation principle (cf. Myerson, 1982), a general contract is of
the form (x(c); t(c))c2C , specifying permitted output and associated payment for
each reported cost type c. The principal proposes the contract that maximizes her
expected prot E[V (x)  t] among all contracts that the agent will accept, that
require no payments from agent to principal above t, and that induce truth-telling
by the agent. Hence, the contract has to satisfy the participation constraint
E[t(c)  cx(c)]  u; (PC)
the limited liability constraints
t(c)   t for all c; (LL)
and the incentive compatibility constraints
t(c)  x(c)c  t(c^)  x(c^)c for all c; c^: (IC)
We will look at each constraint in turn. First, we rewrite the incentive compati-
bility constraints in the standard way.
Lemma 1 (IC) is equivalent to the following two conditions:
t(c) = t(cH)  x(cH)cH + x(c)c+
Z cH
c
x()d; (IC1)
and
x is weakly decreasing: (IC2)
For the case of a nite support, (IC1) denes the lowest possible payments to
satisfy (IC) for given t(cH) if we extend functions x : fc1; : : : ; cng ! [0; xmax] on
the interval [cL; cH ] by dening x(c) = x(ci+1) for c 2 (ci; ci+1].
14In this case, the principal would simply compensate the agent for his costs by o¤ering the
contract t = u+ cx  0, so the rst-best solution would be achieved.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, the incentive compatibility constraints determine the transfer pay-
ments up to a constant. Next, we show how this constant is pinned down by the
binding participation constraint.
Lemma 2 In the optimum, the participation constraint is binding. A contract
(x; t) with payment function t given by (IC1) satises (PC) with equality if
t(cH) = u¯ + x(cH)cH  
Z cH
cL
x (c)F (c)dc: (1)
As in Lemma 1, this result also holds for the nite case.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the binding participation constraint distinguishes our hidden in-
formation model from hidden action models with limited liability constraints, in
which the agent typically receives a rent.15
Since transfers are weakly decreasing, they satisfy the limited liability con-
straints if and only if t(cH)   t:
Lemma 3 The principals optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing
E[V (x)  cx] subject to the constraints (IC2) andZ cH
cL
x (c)F (c)dc  x (cH)cH + t+ u: (LL-ICPC)
In particular, if any function xFB with
xFB(c) 2 arg max
x2[0;xmax]
(V (x)  cx)
satises (LL-ICPC), then the principal obtains the rst-best payo¤ SFB  u. Oth-
erwise, the rst-best surplus is not obtainable and the new limited liability con-
straint (LL-ICPC) is binding. As in Lemma 1, this result also holds for the nite
case.
Proof. See the Appendix.
15In these models, the hidden action is typically an e¤ort level chosen by the agent. The
principal can reduce the agents limited liability rent by implementing an e¤ort level that is
smaller than the rst-best benchmark. See e.g. La¤ont and Martimort (2002, section 4.3).
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To analyze the e¤ect of the limited liability constraint, it is natural to rst
consider the case in which the cost parameter can only take one of two values,
C = fcL; cHg. In many settings, the two-type case provides much of the intuition
of the general case. Yet, this is not true in our setup. Specically, in the two-type
case the principal can still achieve the rst-best solution even when payments
must be non-negative. This can be seen from Lemma 3, since condition (LL-
ICPC) for the two-type case is  xFB(cH)E[c]  t+ u:
Remark 2 The principal obtains the rst-best surplus in the two-type case by
proposing the contract x(c) = xFB(c), t(cH) = u + xFB(cH)E[c] and t(cL) =
t(cH) + cL(x
FB(cL)  xFB(cH)).
However, the fact that the limited liability constraint has no e¤ect is an arte-
fact of the binary case. Next, we provide an example with three types which
illustrates why the two-type case is misleading in our setting.
Let C = fcL; cM ; cHg, and let fL; fM ; fH denote the associated probabilities.
We assume xmax = 1; t = 0; u = 0; and a linear prot function V (x) = vx
with cL < cM < v < cH , such that xFB(cL) = xFB(cM) = 1 and xFB(cH) =
0.16 Lemma 3 shows that the rst-best solution cannot be achieved here (since
fL(cM   cL) > 0) and the principal solves
max
xL;xM ;xH2[0;1]
fL(v   cL)xL + fM(v   cM)xM + fH(v   cH)xH
subject to the binding LL-ICPC constraint
fLxM(cM   cL) + (fL + fM)xH(cH   cM) = xHcH :
We see that there is no distortion at the top, xL = 1, and the constraint implies
xH =
xMfL(cM   cL)
(1  fH)cM + fHcH : (2)
Plugging this into the objective function, we can conclude that if
fM(v   cM) + fL(cM   cL)(v   cH)fH
(1  fH)cM + fHcH  0; (3)
the solution has xM = 1, and otherwise it has xM = 0.
This simple example shows that with more than two types, the rst-best
solution is not necessarily attained anymore. Moreover, if fM is large enough, the
16The other conceivable cases would result in the rst-best allocation.
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production level is larger than in the rst-best solution.17 The intuition behind
this result is that due to the limited liability constraint, the principal cannot
extract the agents rent with a subsidy for low production levels, so that instead
the agent makes a non-monetary transferby allowing an ine¢ ciently high level
of pollution. Note that xM = xH = 0 is also possible; i.e., there can also be a
downward distortion of the production level.18
In terms of comparative statics, it is straightforward to see that as v increases,
expected output weakly increases: While xH does not change, condition (3) is
relaxed. Similarly, as cH increases, expected output goes down. More surprisingly,
xH increases in cM for xM = 1, so as long as condition (3) is satised, expected
output increases in cM . The reason is that a larger medium cost type nds it more
attractive to overstate his cost, so that the principal has to make this option less
attractive. The opposite holds true for an increase in cL, which decreases xH , but
can increase expected output if condition (3) becomes true.
Next we consider the case that the cost parameter can take any value in the
interval [cL; cH ]:
Proposition 1 The optimal output schedule xLL satises:
(i) If t + u is su¢ ciently large such that (LL-ICPC) in Lemma 3 is satised
for x = xFB; then xLL = xFB and the principal obtains the rst-best payo¤
SFB   u:
(ii) Else there exists a decreasing function x^, a cut-o¤ c 2 [cL; cH ], and a value
x such that
xLL(c) =
(
x^(c) for all c  c,
x for all c > c.
The function x^ satises x^(c)  xFB(c); with strict inequality if c 6= cL and
0 < xFB(c) < xmax: The threshold value x satises xFB(c)  x  xFB(cH);
with strict inequality if xFB(cH) > 0:
Proof. Since (i) is already shown in Lemma 3, we have to solve the optimization
problem given there for the case that no xFB satises (LL-ICPC), which must
17For example, if fL = fM = fH = 1=3, cL = 1; cM = 2; cH = 4, and v = 3, we have xM = 1
and xH = 1=8.
18For example, if fL = fM = fH = 1=3, cL = 1; cM = 2; cH = 4, and v = 2:1, we have
xM = xH = 0. Note that although the output schedule is very di¤erent from the rst-best
solution, the expected surplus is very close to the rst-best surplus.
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therefore be binding. In order to do this, we write x instead of x(cH) in (LL-
ICPC) and replace (IC2) by the weaker constraint x(c)  x. We consider the
following maximization problem over both x and x:
max
x(:);x
Z cH
cL
(V (x(c))  cx(c))f(c)dc (4)
s:t:
Z cH
cL
x (c)F (c)dc  xcH + t+ u
x(c)  x
This is a relatively simple problem with a concave objective function and linear
constraints. Let x; x denote the solution of this problem. If x turns out to be
a weakly decreasing function with x(cH) = x, then x must also be the solution
of the original maximization problem.
There must exist a Lagrange multiplier   0 and a function   0 with
(c)(x(c)  x) = 0 such that x; x solve
max
x(:);x
Z cH
cL
(V (x(c)) (c+F (c)
f(c)
)x(c)+(xcH +t+ u)+(c)(x(c)  x))f(c)dc: (5)
If (c) > 0 for some c; then x(c) = x; and if (c) = 0, then x(c)  x and
x(c) is a maximizer of V (x)  (c+F (c)
f(c)
)x: If this maximizer is unique, we dene
x^(c) = arg max
x2[0;xmax]
(V (x)  (c+ F (c)
f(c)
)x);
and if the set of maximizers is an interval, then x^(c) is taken to be the upper
interval limit. Our assumption that F is concave implies that as a function of
(x; c), V (x)  (c+ F (c)
f(c)
)x has strictly decreasing di¤erences, which implies that
x^(c) is weakly decreasing. Hence, there must be some cut-o¤ c 2 [cL; cH ] such
that x(c) = x^(c) for c  c and x(c) = x for larger levels of the agents costs.
Similarly, as a function of (x; ), V (x)   (c + F (c)
f(c)
)x has strictly decreasing
di¤erences, which implies that x^(c)  xFB(c). Considering the derivative V 0(x) 
(c+F (c)
f(c)
), we see that the stronger condition x^(c) < xFB(c) holds unless c = cL or
x^(c) is a corner solution with either x^(c) = 0 = xFB(c) or x^(c) = xmax = xFB(c).
Since x can nowhere be smaller than xFB(cH) nor everywhere equal to xmax;
it has to hold that xmax > x  xFB(cH): This can either mean that x =
0 = xFB(cH) or an interior solution for x. In the rst case, x(c) = x^(c); and
the conditions for the threshold x in the Proposition hold with equality. In
the latter case, it must hold that cH = E[] > 0. The function  then has
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to be (c) = 0 for c  c and (c) =  V 0(x) + (c + F (c)
f(c)
) else, and from
cH =
R cH
c
(c  V 0(x) + F (c)
f(c)
)f(c)dc it follows that
 =
R cH
c
(c  V 0(x))f(c)dc
cF (c) +
R cH
c
cf(c)dc
< 1: (6)
Since   0, this expression for  implies that cH > V 0(x), which means that
x > xFB(cH). Moreover, either x = x^(c) < xFB(c) or x < xFB(c) = xmax.
Consider part (ii) of Proposition 1. The optimal contract provides the agent
with a menu of output levels and corresponding payments that the principal must
make to the agent. The induced output schedule has no distortion at the lowest
cost type, then it decreases until it becomes at, intersecting the rst-best output
schedule from below.19 In particular, the smallest level of output in the menu
is chosen by all agents with costs larger than a threshold c. For very high cost
types, production is thus larger than in the rst-best solution.
Recall that in our hidden information setup, the agent learns his cost type only
after the contract has been signed; i.e., in contrast to adverse selection models
with pre-contractual private information no rent will be left to the agent.20 In
the absence of a limited liability constraint, the principal would push the agents
expected utility down to his reservation utility with a suitable payment schedule,
which would be an e¢ cient way of transferring utility between the parties. Yet,
given limited liability, the principal pushes the agent down to his reservation
utility by transferring utility in an ine¢ cient way from the agent to the principal.
Instead of using a monetary payment, the agent sometimes has to su¤er from an
ine¢ ciently high level of production, which benets the principal. The optimal
contract thus no longer maximizes the expected total surplus, instead there is a
trade-o¤ between maximizing the total surplus and minimizing the loss caused
by the ine¢ cient way of transferring utility between the parties, which yields the
novel pattern of distortions derived in Proposition 1.
19Technically, our optimization problem is related to Levin (2003). To nd the optimal
relational contract in a repeated principal-agent setting, he has to solve a static problem of
hidden information in which transfers are limited by the continuation value of the relationship.
In contrast to our model with only a one-sided bound on transfers, in Levin (2003) the second-
best output schedule is at for low cost types and then decreasing, and always strictly below
the rst-best output schedule.
20Observe that this feature distinguishes our model from countervailing incentives models such
as Lewis and Sappington (1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), in which the agent
has private information already at the contracting stage and the agents reservation utility is
type-dependent.
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The optimal contract allows the following interpretation. The principal and
the agent agree on a compensation scheme that is tied to the principals produc-
tion level, t(x), where x 2 [x; xFB(cL)] and t(x) = tLL(c) with xLL(c) = x: The
agent retains the right to set a limit on production, which however cannot be
lower than the threshold x: For a given limit x^ that the agent chooses, the prin-
cipal can choose any x  x^ and has to pay t(x): The principal will then choose
the maximally allowed level x^; and the agent will, after learning his cost type c,
set the limit equal to xLL(c):
It has become commonplace that local governments and developers negotiate
formal contracts regarding projects with potential negative externalities, in which
they specify monetary or in-kind compensation for the host community (Selmi,
2010). From a legal perspective, such contracts can be problematic because the
local government is required to keep the power to react to bad news and always
be able to safeguard the well-being of the community. As Selmi (2010, p. 619)
argues, local governments in the twenty-rst century have very limited nancial
resources and will therefore not be able to simply breach a contract for land
use if circumstances change. In the context of our model, this corresponds to
the fact that limited liability renders a contract as in Remark 1 infeasible. The
optimal contract, which is a combination of a guaranteed production level, a pre-
determined compensation schedule for production above this level, and a exible
cap on production, balances the need for certainty for the developer (e.g. to
protect its relationship-specic investment) and the need for the community to
be able to react to changed circumstances in the future.21
There is a concern and some empirical evidence in the literature that poorer
communities and those with less political participation have to bear more pollu-
tion (see e.g. Hamilton, 1993, and Pargal and Wheeler, 1996). Richer commu-
nities in our model correspond to an agent with a larger t; and more activism
against potential pollution would correspond to a larger u; as the local govern-
ment gains political support if it does not allow the land use by the polluting
21See also Kenney et al. (2004), who document cases of community benets agreements,
some of which specify extensive monitoring of output and environmental damage, combined
with linear fees and annual production caps. They also illustrate the need to react to later cir-
cumstances. For instance, an agreement between a local activist group and a coal mine specied
an annual production cap of 5 million tons and a penalty for higher output levels. However,
when it turned out later that longer trains could transport more without any additional safety
hazards, the cap was amended to allow 5.25 million tons with no additional remuneration for
the community.
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facility: In our model, a decrease in t and u have the same e¤ect on the expected
level of pollution, which can be positive or negative. While a decrease in u would
make the community worse o¤, a decrease in t would leave its expected utility
unchanged, since the larger expected compensation from the community to the
producer would o¤set any increase in pollution levels.
4 Discussion
4.1 Post-contractual vs. pre-contractual information
If the agent knows the realization of his cost type already at the contracting stage,
our model corresponds to a standard adverse selection problem.22 In this case,
the participation constraint (PC) has to be replaced by an individual rationality
constraint that ensures participation for every possible realization of the agents
cost,
t(c)  cx(c)  u for all c: (IR)
Note that in the adverse selection model it is irrelevant whether or not we im-
pose the limited liability constraint, because (IR) already implies (LL) since we
assumed that u  0   t.
Proposition 2 Let xAS(c) denote the allocation from the optimal contract with
pre-contractual private information. It holds that xLL(c)  xAS(c) for all c 2
[cL; cH ].
Proof. In the case of pre-contractual private information, the optimal output
plan is given by
xAS(c) 2 arg max
x
V (x)  (c+ F (c)
f(c)
)x,
and therefore corresponds to  = 1 in the function x^ in the proof of Proposition
1, which also shows that x^ is decreasing in .
Figure 1 shows how the functions xFB, xLL, and xAS compare in a numerical
example. Payments tLL in this example are a convex and decreasing function,
equal to zero where xLL is at. While in this example tLL(c)  tAS(c) for all cost
types, this does not hold in general.
22See e.g. La¤ont and Martimort (2002, p. 134).
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Figure 1. This gure shows xLL and how it compares to xAS (red) and xFB
(green) for the example V (x) = x(1   x2 ), xmax = 1, t = u = 0, and c uniformly
distributed on [0; 1].
Since the agents participation constraint (PC) is binding with post-contractual
private information, while the agent gets an information rent in the case of pre-
contractual private information, the agent is better o¤ in the latter case. The
principal is worse o¤ in the case of pre-contractual private information, because
she could have chosen to implement xAS in the case of post-contractual private
information, but preferred not to do so.
Recall that in the absence of a limited liability constraint, the rst-best so-
lution is attained in the case of post-contractual private information, so the ex-
pected total surplus in this case is at least as large as in the case of pre-contractual
private information (SAS). In contrast, when payments must be non-negative,
then the surplus comparison becomes ambiguous. In particular, the expected
total surplus in the case of post-contractual private information (SLL) can now
be strictly smaller than in the case of pre-contractual private information, where
ex post ine¢ cient upward distortions do not occur. This result is illustrated in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2. In the gure, V (x) = vx, xmax = 1, t = u = 0, and c is uniformly
distributed on [0; 1]. The gure shows the expected total surplus in the case of
post-contractual private information and limited liability (SLL), compared to the
expected total surplus (SAS) and the principals expected prot (PAS) in the case
of pre-contractual private information.
In our hidden information model, we have assumed that the agents costs
only become known with experience, after the principal has built the hazardous
facility and maybe even started production. Another possibility is that the agent
can become informed about his true costs over time also in the absence of an
agreement. We can then also relax the assumption of full commitment by the
principal and assume that negotiations can take place both before (ex ante)
and after (ex post) the agent has learned his cost type. Suppose the agents
reservation utility in the ex post negotiations is zero. In order to accept a
contract at the ex ante stage already, the agent must now be o¤ered at least
u = E[uAS(c)], where uAS(c) =
R cH
c
xAS()d denotes the agents information
rent that he would get in the ex post negotiations. Since xLL maximizes the
expected surplus given the constraints in Lemma 3, and xAS also satises these
constraints for u = E[uAS(c)], it holds in this case that SLL  SAS. Hence, the
parties will indeed sign a contract before the agent learns his cost. The agents
option value of waiting until he learns his disutility may or may not be large
enough to overcome the distortion in production levels, depending on whetherR cH
cL
(xFB(c)   xAS (c))F (c)dc  xFB(cH)cH + t or not. For instance, in the nu-
merical example illustrated in Figure 1 (where xFB(cH) = t = 0), a distortion
due to hidden information arises even if the agent could get a new o¤er after he
has learned his private information.
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4.2 Bargaining power
Following Rob (1989) we have assumed that the pollution-generating rm can
make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. This is the distribution of bargaining power for
which the transaction costs that we study (i.e., hidden information when transfer
payments are bounded) matter most. To capture the specics of some real-world
applications, it may be worthwhile to also study the case in which the agent
has some bargaining power. We therefore now assume that the bargaining stage
results in the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where  2 [0; 1] denotes the
agents bargaining power. The agents disagreement payo¤ dA is given by his
reservation utility u, while the principals disagreement payo¤ dP is given by her
reservation utility zero. Agent and principal bargain over the set of payo¤s that
are attainable with a contract that satises (PC), (LL) and (IC), which has to
be a convex set.
For a xed agents payo¤ uA 2 [0; SFB]; the principals maximum payo¤ is
SLL(uA)  uA; which means that the Pareto frontier of feasible expected payo¤s
consists of all payo¤ pairs (uA; uP ) with uA 2 [0; SFB] and uP = SLL(uA)   uA:
Note that SLL(uA)   uA is decreasing in uA with derivative (uA)   1; where
0  (uA) < 1 is the Lagrange multiplier from the optimization problem in the
proof of Proposition 1 for u = uA, and is equal to zero if SLL(uA) = SFB: As
uA increases, the expected total surplus SLL(uA) increases, and once uA is large
enough such that the condition in Lemma 3 holds, the Pareto frontier becomes
linear and the rst-best solution is attained. Moreover, the function SLL(uA) uA
is indeed concave, since for all contracts (x; t) and (x0; t0) that yield expected
payo¤pairs (uA; uP ) and (u0A; u
0
P ); the contract (x+(1 )x0; t+(1 )t0) also
satises (LL) and (IC) and leaves the agent with a payo¤equal to uA+(1 )u0A
and the principal with a payo¤ of at least uP + (1  )u0P :
The generalized Nash bargaining solution is the maximizer of (uA dA)(uP  
dP )
1  over all feasible expected payo¤pairs (uA; uP ): Since it will select a Pareto
e¢ cient point, the agents bargaining payo¤ can be found by maximizing (uA  
u)(SLL(uA)   uA)1  over uA: Hence, the Nash bargaining solution yields a
negotiation payo¤ uA for the agent that is implicitly given by
u+

1  (uA)(1  )(S
LL(uA)  u) = uA;
In particular, the agents negotiation payo¤ is equal to uA = u+ (SFB   u) if
u+ (SFB   u) 
Z cH
cL
xFB (c)F (c)dc  xFB(cH)cH   t: (7)
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Hence, if the agents bargaining power or his disagreement payo¤ is su¢ ciently
large, the rst-best solution is attained.
4.3 Many agents
One may ask what happens if there are many agents, especially in light of the
negative limit result in Rob (1989). In that paper, the principal bargains with n
agents who have pre-contractual private information about their costs. Suppose
that each agents cost type ci is independently drawn from the same distribution
and the reservation utilities are zero. Moreover, let us hold per-person prots
constant by setting V (x) = nvx, where v < cH and xmax = 1, so that x can be
interpreted as the probability of production. As the number of agents becomes
large, the obstacles to bargaining due to pre-contractual asymmetric information
may become insurmountable. In particular, Rob (1989) shows that there are
circumstances such that when n goes to innity, then the ratio of realized to
potential welfare (i.e., the expected total surplus given the optimal contract under
adverse selection divided by the expected total surplus in the rst-best solution)
converges to zero.23
In contrast, a positive limit result can be established in our setting with
post-contractual private information and limited liability. Specically, when the
number of agents goes to innity, then the ratio of realized to potential welfare
converges to one. To see this, suppose that v > E[ci].24 Consider the following
simple mechanism. The principal proposes to choose x = 1 and to pay E[ci] to
each agent. Note that the payments are non-negative and each agents partici-
pation constraint is binding. The expected total surplus attained by this simple
mechanism, n(v E[ci]), is a lower bound on the expected total surplus that will
be achieved by the principals optimal mechanism. By the law of large numbers,
for the ratio of realized to potential welfare it holds that
lim
n!1
n(v   E[ci])
E[maxfnv   ici; 0g] = limn!1
v   E[ci]
E[maxfv   1
n
ici; 0g] = 1:
23See Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) for a closely related limit result in the context of public
goods. In contrast, Rustichini et al. (1994) show that increasing the number of agents can
mitigate the problems caused by pre-contractual private information in private-good settings.
See also Pesendorfer (1998), who shows that Robs (1989) negative result does not hold if the
agentstypes are correlated.
24If v  E[ci], then the expected total surplus in the rst-best solution converges to zero
when n goes to innity.
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Intuitively, when the number of agents goes to innity, then the ex post e¢ cient
decision is already known with probability one ex ante, such that the principal
can simply compensate each agent for his expected costs.
5 Concluding remarks
We have provided a new perspective on the classical topic of Coasian contracting
to internalize a negative externality. In our model, the principal can implement a
veriable production level, the agent learns the realization of the costs caused by
pollution after the contract is signed, and payments to the agent are not allowed
to become (too) negative. We have shown that for high cost types there may be an
upward distortion of the production level. Moreover, the expected total surplus
in our hidden information model can be smaller than the expected total surplus
in an otherwise similar adverse selection problem in which the agent learns his
cost type before the contract is written.
Situations in which a rms or a government agencys decisions may cause
negative externalities abound in practice. Related examples include the siting of
waste dumps, power plants, electricity pylons, or wind turbines. Similarly, com-
munities might su¤er from having adult entertainment clubs, drug consumption
rooms, homeless shelters, or refugee hostels in their backyards. Also in these
applications it is well possible that the agents disutility (e.g., due to nuisance
caused by noise) is learned only after the facility is built, and the extent of the
nuisance is increasing in the veriable occupancy rate.
Yet, while we have assumed that the agent has the right to be una¤ected by
externalities, in some applications this might not be the case.25 The principal
would then choose xmax, which in our model would lead to an expected total
surplus smaller than in the solution we have characterized.26 Moreover, in some
applications the federal government may be the principal and a local authority
may be the agent. In this case, one might also want to consider the possibility
that the principals objective function puts some weight  2 (0; 1) on the agents
utility (cf. Baron and Myerson, 1982).
25In settings with pre-contractual private information, Samuelson (1985) and McKelvey and
Page (2002) study whether the polluter or the pollutee should have the relevant property rights.
See also Matouschek (2004) and the Segal and Whinston (2013) for related models.
26The reason is that xLL maximizes expected surplus subject to some constraints as stated
in Lemma 3, and xmax also satises these constraints.
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Recall that our model is tailored to the case in which the principal implements
the production level, while the agent is negatively a¤ected by production, which is
a standard setup in environmental problems. In other contexts such as employer
employee relationships it is the agent who implements the production level by
making a costly e¤ort decision. However, even when e¤ort is veriable, our
model might not be directly applicable in such a setup. The reason is that
the contractually specied e¤ort level might not be enforceable, since the agent
cannot be ned for breaking the contract when he has no resources (which rules
out monetary punishments).
Yet, there may also be circumstances under which our model could be applied,
since the employee might be willing to adhere to the contract for reputational
concerns (say, because the employer could threaten to pass the employee over for
promotion in the future, or the employee might fear being judged a job hopper if
he leaves early). Moreover, both the limited liability assumption and the assump-
tion that the cost of reaching a given output level is private information and only
learned on the job are very natural in the employment setting. Thus, our upward
distortion result could provide a novel explanation for why employees sometimes
work too much compared to what would be socially desirable.27
Finally, while there is a large contract-theoretic literature on adverse selec-
tion models in which the agent has pre-contractual private information, hidden
information models in which the agent becomes privately informed after the con-
tract has been signed have received somewhat less attention.28 In environmental
problems in practice, it is likely the case that the parties have already some in-
formation when the contract is written, while additional information is learned
later on. Studying hybrid models with both pre-contractual and post-contractual
private information and bounded payments might be an interesting avenue for
future research.29
27The fact that overwork may be a severe problem has been suggested by several empirical
studies, see e.g. Galinsky et al. (2005).
28See e.g. the recent work by Iossa and Martimort (2015) and the literature discussed there.
29For an early paper that combines pre-contractual and post-contractual private information,
see Riordan and Sappington (1987). See also Crémer and Khalil (1994) and Crémer et al. (1998),
where the agent can gather pre-contractual information about his type (which otherwise he will
learn after the contract is signed). Yet, these papers do not study the implications of bounded
transfer payments.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
First, assume that (IC1) and (IC2) hold. With the transfer function dened by
(IC1), the agents utility u(c) = t(c) x(c)c is equal to u(c) = u(cH)+
R cH
c
x()d,
and (IC) is satised:
u(c)  u(c^) =
Z c^
c
x()d  (c^  c)x(c^),
where we have used that x is weakly decreasing. Second, let (IC) be satised.
Assuming c^ > c, (IC) implies t(c)   x(c)c  t(c^)   x(c^)c and t(c^)   x(c^)c^ 
t(c)   x(c)c^, which in turn implies (c^   c)x(c)  (c^   c)x(c^), hence x must be
weakly decreasing. To show that (IC1) is also satised, consider rst the case
of a nite support. It holds that u(ci)   u(ci+1)  (ci+1   ci)x(ci+1) as well as
(ci+1   ci)x(ci)  u(ci)  u(ci+1), which implies for any c = cl
n 1X
i=l
x(ci+1)(ci+1   ci)  u(c)  u(cH) 
n 1X
i=l
x(ci)(ci+1   ci): (8)
It follows that for xed t(cH),
t(c) = u(cH) + x(c)c+
n 1X
i=l
x(ci+1)(ci+1   ci)
is the pointwise smallest possible payment function such that (x; t) satises (IC).
For the case that the support is the interval [cL; cH ], condition (8) holds for any
partition c = cl < cl+1 < : : : < cn = cH of the interval [c; cH ], so that in the limit
as the partition becomes ner, we getZ cH
c
x()d = u(c)  u(cH):

Proof of Lemma 2.
Assume that a contract (x; t) with E[t(c)   cx(c)] > u solved the principals
problem. Note that it cannot be that x(c) = xmax and t(c) =  t, because
this contract would violate the participation constraint ( xmaxE[c]   t < u).
There would exist a su¢ ciently small " > 0 such that the contract (ex;et) withex(c) = (1   ")x(c) + "xmax and et(c) = (1   ")t(c)   "t satises (PC). This new
contract would also satisfy (LL) and (IC), and it would yield a strictly higher
utility for the principal. Hence, the participation constraint must be binding.
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Plugging the payment function given by (IC1) into the agents expected payo¤
function yields
E[t(c)  cx(c)] = t(cH)  x (cH)cH +
Z Z
[c]
x()ddF (c).
Changing the order of integration (applying Fubinis theorem), we can write the
right-hand side as
t(cH)  x (cH)cH +
Z cH
cL
F ()x ()d.
Hence, setting E[t(c)   cx(c)] = u yields the expression for t(cH) as claimed in
the Lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
With t(c) dened by (IC1) and t(cH) by (PC) as in Lemma 2, the objective
function is equal to E[V (x)   cx] and the limited liability constraint t(cH) 
 t takes the form of (LL-ICPC). If (LL-ICPC) holds strictly and the principal
receives less than SFB   u, then due to concavity of the objective function, the
principals prot can be increased if x is replaced by "xFB + (1   ")x for some
small " > 0 such that (LL-ICPC) is still satised. 
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